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Optimistic versus Pessimistic
—Optimal Judgemental Bias with Reference Point
Si Chen∗
This paper develops a model of reference-dependent assessment
of subjective beliefs in which loss-averse people optimally choose
the expectation as the reference point to balance the current fe-
licity from the optimistic anticipation and the future disappoint-
ment from the realization.The choice of over-optimism or over-
pessimism depends on the real chance of success and optimistic
decision makers prefer receiving early information. In the port-
folio choice problem, pessimistic investors tend to trade conserva-
tively, however, they might trade aggressively if they are sophis-
ticated enough to recognise the biases since low expectation can
reduce their fear of loss.
Neoclassical economics uses a natural simplification of human behaviour as gov-
erned by limitless cognitive ability applied to a handful of perceptible goals and
untangled by emotions(Stewart (1998)). One fundamental proposition from this
presumption is rational expectation(Muth (1961)) simply declaring that agents’
predictions of the future value of economically relevant variables are not systemat-
ically wrong in that all errors are random. Equivalently, this is to say that agents’
expectation is consistent with the true statistical expectation. Nevertheless, there
are plentiful evidences of deviations from rational expectations, with the most
prominent one showing that individuals err in their probability assessments and
not in random, but in systematic directions. In particular, when the task is very
difficult with rare positive events, people often exhibit over-pessimism and overes-
timate the probabilities of bad outcomes(Kruger (1999); Windschitl, Kruger and
Simms (2003); Kruger and Burrus (2004)). On the other hand, when the task is
easy and the probability of success is reasonably high, people tend to exhibit over-
optimism and overestimate the probabilities of good outcomes(Fischhoff, Slovic
and Lichtenstein (1977); Svenson (1981); Hoffrage (2004))1. In short, subjec-
tive belief of a good outcome increases with its real chance but always contains
systematic biases.
These systematic biases provide strong evidences against the prevailing assump-
tions that people are either completely rational or completely irrational and er-
ratic in making predictions toward the future(De Long et al. (1990); Friedman
and Mezzetti (2005)). Specifically, people are capable of capturing the proba-
bilities of success and failure to a reasonable extent of accuracy, like rational
∗ Correspondence address: Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road Building,
Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK
1See Moore and Healy (2008) for a review.
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individuals2; but when it comes to forming subjective beliefs, they will deceive
themselves and choose biased beliefs as if they are irrational since utilities are not
only from an accurate prediction. Based on these observations, we build a model
in which agents choose the optimal subjective beliefs and optimal expectations as
in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005); Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007)3.
Different from their models, individuals are reference dependent and loss averse.
The expectation formed by subjective beliefs serves naturally as the reference
point(Koszegi and Rabin (2006)). Hence, higher anticipation not only produces
current felicity as in BP, but also results in potential greater future loss. Individ-
uals manipulate their beliefs to trade off the benefit of an optimistic future with
the cost of a painful loss. In particular, my model contains three main elements:
First, utilities consist of two parts: anticipatory utility and future gain-loss util-
ity. Previous studies suggest that a forward-looking decision maker cares about
both utilities(Loewenstein (1987); Caplin and Leahy (2001); Benabou and Tirole
(2004); Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005))4. Decision makers weigh anticipatory
utility against future utility depending on the specific circumstances such as the
time to payoff date and how significant they value the lottery.
Second, utility is reference dependent. We assume the future utility is refer-
ence dependent(Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2009))
and the anticipation serves naturally as the reference point(Koszegi and Rabin
(2006)). Anticipatory and future utilities are therefore linked together by the ref-
erence point which is constituted by an agent’s subjective beliefs. For simplicity,
anticipatory utility is assumed to be reference independent and it takes the value
of ordinary expectation.
Third, individuals are loss averse. Previous studies without loss-aversion usu-
ally lead to optimistic judgemental biases(Brunnermeier and Parker (2005); Brun-
nermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007); Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005)). In our
model, over-pessimism is also possible, because loss due to optimism can be more
heavily felt than the felicity from a good anticipation.
All these three factors together give our decision makers inner conflicts in mak-
ing predictions. They always enjoy being ambitious, while hate to be disap-
pointed; enjoy feeling lucky, while hate to be hopeless. Optimal beliefs (and asso-
ciated optimistic and pessimistic attitudes) are then chosen by weighting current
anticipation and future utility, depending on the probabilistic properties of the
lotteries, the future discount rate and the intensity of loss aversion.
Psychological theories and evidence support this intuition. Contemporary psy-
chology acknowledges that the human behaviour is influenced simultaneously by
2In situations with ambiguity, this statement is still valid(see Camerer and Weber (1992) for a review).
Although agents facing ambiguity are unable to capture the true distribution, they can apprehend a family
of such distributions and a probability distribution over the family. Their best guess works as a good
proxy of the objective distribution.
3Spiegler (2008) discussed the problems in revealed-preference approach and information acquisition
raised by “utility-from-belief” models.
4Caplin and Leahy (2004); Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) pointed out the problems in reveal preference
approach brought by forward-looking utility.
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conscious(control System 1) and nonconscious(automatic, System 1) processes(Chaiken
and Trope (1999)). Neuropsychology using fMRI technique has provided evidence
that the ventral medial prefonrtal cortex compete with the prefrontal cortex for
the control of the response to the problems given in the belief-bias test(Goel and
Dolan (2003)). These studies indicate that individuals are more capable than pre-
viously assumed in capturing the real probabilistic pattern of stochastic events,
but can subconsciously deceive themselves into biased beliefs. To quote Kah-
neman (2011), the process through which people choose subjective beliefs is the
result of an uneasy interaction between two systems: “System 2 articulates judge-
ments and makes choices, but it often endorses or rationalizes ideas and feelings
that were generated by System 1.”. Even though the real biological process in
distorting beliefs is not fully deciphered, this view gives a reasonable interpre-
tation that human mind is operated as a dual and conflicting system—pursuing
mental pleasures like idealists while staying close to reality as physicalists.
Moreover, previous experimental studies pointed out that subjective beliefs can
change from optimism to pessimism without any additional information(Shepperd,
Ouellette and Fernandez (1996); Taylor and Shepperd (1998); Sweeny, Carroll and
Shepperd (2006); Mayraz (2011b)) For example, Shepperd, Ouellette and Fernan-
dez (1996) conducted an experiment in which students estimate their exam scores
a month before the exam, then again several times after completing the exam yet
prior to receiving feedbacks. As the date of feedback drawing near, students turn
their optimistic forecasts into pessimistic forecasts. The switch in attitudes im-
plies that people can manipulate beliefs for their interests: when the threaten of
loss becomes more relevant, pessimism is preferred to optimism since it placates
the anxiousness of loss. In Mayraz (2011b), price predictions of financial assets
based on the same historical charts are significantly higher for subjects gaining
from high prices than those gaining from low prices. Asymmetry in predictions
is attributed to the different choices of anticipations as reference points.
This paper proceeds as follows. After presenting the relevant literatures in
Section I, Section II presents the agent’s formal problem and model predictions
on the choice of optimal beliefs, starting with the general multiple-state model
followed by a two-state example. Subjective beliefs bias up and down depend-
ing on whether the real chance of success exceeds a cut-off probability uniquely
determined by intensity of loss aversion and future discount rate. We further
discuss a short application on information timing preference following the work
in Koszegi and Rabin (2009)(KR2009). It is shown that as the confidence level
decreases, biased agents abandon their preference to early information in favour of
staying uninformed while rational agents are indifferent. Section III explores the
basic premise of the model—risk attitudes over lotteries. We divide the agents
into two types—“naive” and “sophisticated” , according to their different cog-
nitive processes: sophisticated agents recognise their biases in making decisions
while naive ones do not. Therefore, naive agents show preference to skewness and
spreading in distribution while sophisticated agents behave similarly to rational
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ones except overweighing low-ranking outcomes. Section IV applies the model
to the portfolio choice problem. Following previous categorisation of agents, we
conclude that naive optimistic agents trade aggressively while pessimistic ones
trade conservatively. Sophisticated agents can bear more(less) risks than ratio-
nal ones when low-ranking returns5 are good(bad) relative to risk-free return,
because loss aversion dictates a higher weight on bad returns. Moreover, sophis-
ticated pessimistic investors can bear excess risks than optimistic ones because
low anticipation reduces their fears for loss and makes them numb. Furthermore,
we explore the pricing implication in a market with identical investors and short-
sale constraint. Price of the risky asset in a naive market decreases as the market
becomes pessimistic but exhibits a U-shape in a sophisticated market implying
that a market with the moderate confidence level has the highest equity premium.
Finally, Section V discusses the model’s scope and limitations.
I. Relevant Literature
Related literatures are divided into three groups: 1.optimal beliefs 2.reference-
dependent utilities 3.biased beliefs in asset pricing.
A. Optimal beliefs
Literatures on distorted optimal beliefs are built on the assumption that people
choose subjective biased beliefs departing from the real probabilities. Previous
studies can be divided into three branches: one focuses on anticipatory utilities
of forward-looking decision makers6; one focuses on cognitive dissonance in which
people hold inconsistent beliefs to comfort their past experiences(Rabin (1994);
Epstein and Kopylov (2006))7; the third branch focuses on biased beliefs arising
from self-signalling with imperfect memory(Benabou and Tirole (2002, 2004);
Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005))8. This review focuses on the first branch that
is most relevant to the thesis.
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)(BP2005) built a structural model and gave
two applications: choice between a risky and a risk-free asset and a consumption-
saving problem with stochastic income. The underlying intuition is straight-
forward: agents with anticipatory utilities are willing to hold optimistic biased
beliefs to achieve higher current felicity. They trade off the current felicity from
a higher expectation with the cost of making a sub-optimal decision and thus
5Low-ranking returns refer to the bad returns of a risky asset.
6Akerlof and Dickens (1982) proposed a model in which workers in hazardous professions choose
their subjective beliefs of an accident to balance their anticipatory feelings of danger and money spent
on safety equipments.
7For example, Epstein and Kopylov (2006) built a axiomatic model in which agents adjust their
beliefs after taking an action so as to be more optimistic about the possible consequences.
8For example, Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) developed multiself-consistency game where decision
makers have both anticipatory utility and imperfect memory. In order to benefit from anticipation,
agents with imperfect recall prefer staying uninformed and exhibit over-optimism.
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worse-realized outcomes due to the biased beliefs. Agents balance these effects
and choose their optimal beliefs to maximize the average utility. They concluded
that a small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to a first-order gain in an-
ticipatory utility while only induces second-order cost from the poor decision.
Further applying this model to the financial market, BP achieved two conclu-
sions: 1. Investors always overestimate the return of their investment, which
encourages them to long or short too much of the risky asset compared to what
would maximize their objective expected utility9. 2. Investors tend to invest in an
asset with high level of positive skewness even if the asset earns a negative average
excess return. In the consumption-saving application, BP further concluded that
agents are both over-confident and over-optimistic.
Spiegler (2008) criticized BP’s model in two perspectives : 1. BP’s model fails
the rudimentary revealed preference test since the IIA (Irrelevance of Independent
Alternatives) is violated. The reason is that subjective beliefs in BPs model are
derived directly from payoffs of the lottery in the choice set10. 2. BP’s model
cannot capture the preference for biased information sources. Intuitively, by
assuming people have desires to attain self-serving beliefs, BP’s model should
also provide explanations of people’s preference for information sources which can
distort the beliefs indirectly. However, Spiegler proved that in BP, the decision
maker is never averse to information since the support of subjective beliefs does
not update to signals containing uncertainty. The rationale for this criticism lies
in BP’s assumption that the action, rather than beliefs is the most fundamental
choice variable. Subjective beliefs are inertial to new information as long as the
punishment from the sub-optimal action stays the same. With the assistant of loss
aversion, decision makers in our model are able to choose subjective beliefs directly
and they exhibit different tastes for information depending on their optimistic and
pessimistic attitudes. Experimental evidence also fails to justify BPs conclusions.
Mayraz (2011b) gives a further critique on BP2005: BP’s model assumes that
the biased beliefs are costly for a decision maker in material terms due to poor
decisions. That means, the magnitude of the bias depends on the incentives
for accuracy, and the bias can only be substantial when incentives for accuracy
are weak. However, this assumption is rejected by experimental data in Mayraz
(2011b): it is observed that the biases are independent of material costs from
poor decisions11. An extension to Mayraz’s intuition is that in situations where
9Specifically, they enter into over-possession of the risky asset with average excess return greater than
0, and hold inadequate risky asset with average excess return smaller than 0.
10Spiegler (2008) constructed 3 lotteries in states s1...sn with payoffs in the matrix:
action/state s1 s2 ... sn
lf 0 0 0 0
lr 1 −k −k −k
lr′ m −n −n −n
,
where k,m, n > 0,m > 1 and k satisfies: cBP {lf , lr} = c{lf , lr}. Based on BP’s model, subjective belief
to s1 is q1 = 1. When the choice set becomes {lf , lr, lr′}, q1 = 1 leads to lr′  lr and cBP {lf , lr, lr′} =
lr′ . However, with n big enough, lf  lr′ ,leading to a violation of IIA.
11Subjects observed the historical price chart of a financial asset, and received both an accuracy bonus
for predicting the price at some future point, and an unconditional award that was either increasing or
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the decision maker has no control over final outcomes, there is no punishment
for sub-optimal actions and optimal-belief holders in BP will bias up as much
as they wish. Finally, Mayraz developed an axiomatic model in which choice of
beliefs is payoff dependent: agents believe what they want to be true (Mayraz
(2011a)). Agents derive their optimistic and pessimistic attitudes based on an
attitude parameter exogenous to the model.
Our model mainly takes the framework of BP with some modifications. Like
BP, decision makers in our model are forward-looking and the introduction of
anticipatory utility to the ordinary economic model brings the tendency of opti-
mism. Unlike BP, decision makers are loss averse and this behavioural element
provides first-order counter force to anticipation, making pessimism preferable
to optimism when loss aversion is strong enough. In situations where agents do
not discount future, pessimism is always more beneficial since the intense hurt
from loss by setting a high anticipation always exceeds the happiness from gain
brought by that anticipation.
B. Reference-dependent utilities
The prospect theory first proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
in their 1979 paper pointed out that: the evaluation of outcomes is compared
to a reference point; the aversion to loss is significantly intensive than the fe-
licity from gain with a diminishing sensitivity to changes in an outcome as it
moves farther away from the reference point; subjective probability of a prospect
is non-linear in the true probability—in particular, people overweigh small prob-
abilities and under-weigh high probabilities. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) built a
model with a separation of the reference-independent “consumption utility” and
the “gain-loss utility” based on the essential intuition of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). The reference point in their model is simply people’s rational expectation
determined by the “personal equilibrium” —an equilibrium in which expectation
is consistent with the optimal choice under that expectation. With application
to the consumer behaviour, they observed that the price a person wishes to pay
for a commodity increases with the expected price conditional on purchase and
the expected probability of purchase. Another application lies in the within-day
labour-supply decision. A worker is likely to continue working only if they re-
ceive income less than their expectation. Based on their 2006 model, Koszegi and
Rabin (2009)(KR2009) developed a rational dynamic model in which people are
loss averse over changes in rational expectation about present and future con-
sumption. They concluded that when agents are more sensitive to news about
upcoming consumption than to news about distant consumption, then 1. agents
prefer receiving early information rather than later; 2. agents boost consumption
immediately but delays cuts; 3. Agents feel piecemeal information undesirable
decreasing in this price. The statistical test indicates that the magnitude of the bias is independent of
the amount paid for accurate predictions.
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due to the diminishing marginal utility of loss. Our model employs KR’s set-
ting of utility function: utility is composed of separable reference-independent
“consumption utility” and reference-dependent “gain-loss utility”. Different from
their model, however, agents are no longer rational and can optimally manipulate
their beliefs. It should be noted that Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) commented that
“the model fails to account for a variety of realistic prior-dependent attitudes to
information, which intuitively seems to originate from anticipatory feelings”12.
Finally, Macera (2011) explored the time-path of subjective probability assess-
ment. She built a two-state model in which an agent experiences gains and losses
from the changes in anticipation and waits T periods for the realisation of the
outcome. In each period, the agent makes assessment of her likelihood of success
to maximize the intertemporal utility. One major conclusion is that the optimism
decreases as the payoff date gets close because the threat of disappointment be-
comes significant. With application to the design of bonuses, she found that the
decreasing path of optimism leads to a strong preference to bonuses. Thus opti-
mal bonuses granted with a periodicity strengthen the motivation while restrain
the payoffs in a reasonable size. Different from Macera (2011), our model explores
the choice of subjective beliefs in the multi-state setting where ex post dissonance
is excluded from discussion.
C. Biased beliefs in asset pricing
Barberis and Huang (2008) studied the asset pricing implications of the cumu-
lative prospect theory in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), focusing on the proba-
bility weighting component. They proved that in a one-period equilibrium setting
with normally distributed security payoffs and homogeneous investors evaluating
risk based on cumulative prospect theory, the CAPM still holds. Moreover, they
introduced an additional small, independent and positively skewed security into
the economy and derived an equilibrium for homogeneous cumulative prospect
theory investors. As the investors overweigh the tails of the portfolio and skewed
security’s return, they concluded that the skewed security can be overpriced and
can earn a negative average excess return. A further extension to BP2005 is made
in Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007) in which they built a general equi-
librium model with complete markets. They showed that when investors hold
optimal beliefs like in BP2005, portfolio choice and security prices match six ob-
served patterns: 1. investors are not perfectly diversified due to biased beliefs;
2. the cost of biased beliefs puts limits on biases and make the utility cost not
explosive; 3. Investors only over-invest in one Arrow-Debreu security and smooth
the consumptions across all the other states because of the complementarity be-
tween believing a state more likely and purchasing more of the asset that pays
off in that state; 4. Identical investors can have heterogeneous optimal portfolio
12For instance, a patient who wants to have full knowledge of her medical condition when she is quite
sure that she is in good health, yet does not want to know the whole truth when she is not so sure(Eliaz
and Spiegler (2006)).
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choices since different households have different states to be optimistic about;
5. investors tend to over-invest in the most skewed asset because the low-price
and low-probability states are the cheapest states to buy consumption in. Thus
over-optimism about these states distorts consumption the least in the rest of the
states; 6. more skewed assets provide lower returns because of the higher demand
for them.
The structure of subjective beliefs in our model is compatible to the cumula-
tive prospect theory which serves as the foundation of Barberis and Huang (2008).
Further more, the preference to pessimism may lead to different conclusions to
Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007) in Arrow-Debreu asset pricing model.
Though this thesis mainly focus on the fundamental discussions of people’s risk
attitudes, light can be shed on asset pricing in markets with optimistic or pes-
simistic attitudes.
II. The Model
A. The Utility Function
Consider a multi-state model with two periods and one agent. There is a
lottery with contingent payoffs and the associated distribution that are known by
the agent. We assume the agent has no control over the true distribution or the
final outcomes but she can deceive herself by manipulating her subjective beliefs.
The first period corresponds to the time when the agent builds her beliefs and
anticipation and the second period is the payoff realization period. The agent
at t=1 has an imminent utility from her anticipation of the future payoffs as
well as a prospective gain-loss utility due to the difference between the payoffs
actually realised at t=2 and her anticipation at t=1. The agent chooses her
optimal subjective beliefs by considering both the anticipatory utility and the
future prospective gain-loss utility. We further assume that the subjective beliefs
remain constant over two periods, meaning that regression is not allowed once
beliefs are formed. The model is formally described as following.
S = {1, ..., S}, S ≥ 2, is the set of states of nature and Zs = Z1, ..., ZS are the
corresponding material payoffs where 0 ≤ Z1 ≤ Z2 ≤ ... ≤ ZS . The objective
probability associated with the state s is ps, for s = 1, ..., S. Following the
basic assumptions made in Koszegi and Rabin (2009), we assume that an agent’s
utility is separable and consists of a “consumption utility” and a “universal gain-
loss utility” 13: consumption utility takes the form of u(Zs), with u
′ > 0, u′′ ≤
13In Koszegi and Rabin (2009), the decision maker’s period-t instantaneous utility ut depends on
the consumption in period t, and the changes in period t to beliefs about contemporaneous and future
consumption:
ut = m(ct) +
T∑
τ=t
γt,τN(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ).
m(ct) represents the “consumption utility” and can be thought of as the classical reference-independent
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0, u(0) = 0, and the “gain-loss utility” takes the form of µ(x) = x for x ≥ 0
and µ(x) = λx (λ > 1) for x < 0.14 For simplicity, u(Zs) is denoted by us and
we have u1 ≤ u2 ≤ ... ≤ uS by assumption. The anticipatory utility formed
by the agent’s subjective beliefs about the consumption utility realised in the
second period is
∑
s∈S
qsus, where qs is the subjective beliefs assigned to state s for
s = 1, ..., S. The prospective gain-loss utility comes from the difference between
the subjective beliefs and the objective ones is
∑
s∈S
psµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus). The agent
at t=1 chooses her optimal subjective beliefs to solve the following maximization
problem
(1) Max
{qs}s∈S
U =
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈S
psµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
s.t.
∑
s∈S
qs = 1
where 0 < η ≤ 1 is the weight on “gain-loss utility” with the weight on “con-
sumption utility” normalized to 1. The upper bound of η is set to 1 to meet the
revealed preference requirement.15. The weight on gain-loss utility can also be
viewed as the discount rate of future utility.
B. Optimal Beliefs
This section presents the fundamental properties of optimal beliefs in 1. All
the proofs are given in Appendix A.
PROPOSITION 1: (Biased Beliefs are Preferred to Rational Unbiased Beliefs):
If λ ≥ 1
η
, then for s = 1, ..., S, S ≥ 2, there exists at least one qs 6= ps, s.t.
UBS ≥ URE, where UBS and URE are the utilities under biased and rational be-
liefs respectively.
utility. N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) =
∫ 1
0 µ(m(cFt,τ (p)) −m(cFt−1,τ (p)))dp represents the “gain-loss utility” and is
derived from the changes in beliefs over future outcomes between periods where cF (p) is the consumption
level at percentile p and µ(·) the universal gain-loss utility function. In our model, we simplify their model
into two periods and assume there is no contemporaneous gain-loss utility at t = 1. Thus anticipation
takes the value of expectation. At t=1, there is a prospective gain-loss utility due to the deviation of
subjective beliefs from objective ones. We assume γ = 1 since the effect of γ can be included in the effect
of η under our linear setting of gain-loss utility function.
14In Appendix B, we discuss the case with a more general assumption µ′(−x) = λ(x)µ′(x), where
λ(x) > 1, x > 0, and lim
x→0λ(x) = 1, µ
′′(x) ≤ 0. The conclusions are not different from the linear
assumption case.
15Specifically, this assumption is required to meet the revealed preference between these two lotteries:
(0, 0) and (1, 0) with probabilities (p, 1 − p). Obviously, we have (1, 0)  (0, 0) for any value of p.
Therefore, p+ η(1− p)− ηλp ≥ 0. Then we have η ≤ −p
1−p−λp . For p =
1
λ
, we can derive that η ≤ 1.
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Proposition 1 says that an agent who cares about both anticipatory utility and
prospective gain-loss utility never holds rational beliefs, even though being either
over-optimistic or over-pessimistic is costly. The model rationalizes the existence
of biased beliefs when agents have no control power over the realisation of a
gamble.
PROPOSITION 2: (Beliefs Tradeoff among Different States):
An agent prefers moving a small probability ε from a bad(good) state to a bad(good)
state if the objective probability of getting an outcome better than her expectation
is high(low):
∀k, l ∈ S with k > l, if P+ > (<)P ∗, then we have,
U(qk + ε, ql − ε, q−) > U(qk, ql, q−),
where ε > (<)0 is a small number; P+ =
∑
A
ps, A = {s ∈ S : us −
∑
s∈S
qsus ≥ 0};
P ∗ =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) .
PROPOSITION 3: (Over-optimistic versus Over-pessimistic)
Optimal beliefs defined by problem 1 feature the following properties:
(i) The probabilities of high(low) rank outcomes are over-estimated(under-estimated)
if the objective probability of getting an outcome better than the objective expecta-
tion is high(low).
That is, on average, an agent is over-optimistic(over-pessimistic):∑
s∈S
qsus > (<)
∑
s∈S
psus,
if P 0+ > (<)P
∗, where P =
∑
A0
ps, A
0 = {s ∈ S : us −
∑
s∈S
psus ≥ 0}.
(ii) An agent is less likely to be over-optimistic if she is more loss averse and
if she cares more about future utility: P ∗is increasing in λ and η.
(iii)The optimal set of subjective beliefs {qs} satisfies P+ = P ∗ and is not unique.
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are related to each other. Proposition 2 de-
scribes the dynamic process of adjusting subjective probabilities among different
states, while Proposition 3 illustrates the properties of subjective beliefs and ex-
pectations in the stable state.
A shared factor in the two propositions is the cut-off probability P ∗ which is
uniquely determined by an agent’s preference parameters: the intensity of loss-
aversion λ and the weight on gain-loss utility η. For any lottery, an agent deter-
mines whether she will further increase or decrease her subjective expectation by
comparing the total chance of getting a gain with P ∗. The cut-off rule implies that
despite distortions in beliefs, there is a reasonable correspondence between true
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probabilities and optimal beliefs: the higher probabilities of good outcomes give
stronger reason to be optimistic. Intuitively, people tend to be over-pessimistic
and set a low anticipation to reduce the potential painful feeling of loss when the
bad outcomes are very likely to happen. On the contrary, when the chance for
good outcomes is high, people tend to be over-optimistic and overestimate the
chance of good outcomes, because the threaten of loss is relatively weak and high
anticipation is more beneficial. Our intuition is consistent with empirical evidence
in previous studies described in Chapter 1.
In stable state, beliefs and expectations are adjusted to a level to make the total
probability from “gain” states equal to the cut-off P ∗. Whether the subjective
expectation is above or below the rational expectation is determined by the real
probability distribution of the lottery. In particular, the subjective expectation is
higher(lower) than the rational level if the total probability of gains under rational
expectation is smaller(greater) than P ∗.
The second fold of proposition 3 is also very intuitive: a person who is more
loss averse and cares more about future utility tends to have low confidence. This
intuition is directly reflected in the cut-off P ∗: higher P ∗ leaves fewer room for
optimism and those agents with high P ∗ turn into optimistic only if the lottery
promises even higher chance of success. This result can be related to the empirical
facts Shepperd, Ouellette and Fernandez (1996); Taylor and Shepperd (1998) that
the level of optimism decreases as the realisation date comes closer, in which case,
P ∗ gradually increases to 1 as the discount factor η approaches 1.
Finally, the optimal sets of beliefs are not unique. The cut-off rule only de-
termines whether an agent is over-optimistic or over-pessimistic on average. Be-
liefs assigned to distribution tails can be opposite to the average trend, that is
an optimistic agent can underestimate the chances of extremely good outcomes.
Therefore, the structure of subjective beliefs is compatible with the Cumulative
Prospect Theory proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
C. A Short Application: Information Timing preference
The model above describes the process of self-deception—people directly choose
their confidence level. Both casual observations and experimental evidence sug-
gest that self-confidence has a lot to do with the information seeking behaviour.
Following the work of KR2009 in which they studied rational agents’ timing pref-
erence of information, this section extends the model to the preference of agents
with optimistic and pessimistic biases.
We follow the assumptions made above on utility functions. Now, the agent
may receive an early signal i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., S} at t=1 about her future payoff
and the signal is always correct, meaning that the payoff realised at t=2 will be
no different from what the agent has learned at t=1. Or, an agent can refuse to
observe the early signal and wait until payoff is realised at t=2.
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The agent’s expected total utility from observing an early signal is
(2)
∑
s∈S
qsus + η ·
∑
s∈S
qsµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)
The first term is the anticipatory utility stated as before while the second term
captures the expected prospective gain-loss utility in period 1 for an agent holding
biased subjective beliefs {qs}. As the signal is correct, no further gain-loss utility
occurs in the second period. Compared with the previous situation without early
signal, the following propositions are proved to be valid (Details of the proof can
be found in Appendix A).
PROPOSITION 4: (Information Timing Preference)
An agent prefers (not) to receive early information about her payoff if the objec-
tive probability of getting an outcome better than the expectation based on objective
beliefs is high(low). That is,
if P 0+ > (<)P
∗, then Uearly > (<)Uwait, where P 0+ =
∑
A0
ps, A
0 = {s ∈ S :
us −
∑
s∈S
psus ≥ 0} and P ∗ = ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) .
Proposition 4 says that if P 0+ > P
∗, an agent strictly prefers to receive the
information early; if P 0+ = P
∗, she is indifferent; if P 0+ < P ∗, she prefers to
stay uninformed. Intuitively, an optimistic agent tends to seek early information
because she believes a good signal is more likely to happen. Instead, early infor-
mation is undesirable for a pessimistic agent since she is unwilling to expose to
bad results early ex ante. Pessimistic agents prefer the gain-loss utility coming in
the period of realisation as they overestimate the chance of loss in advance.
Furthermore, our conclusion extends the conclusion of KR2009. In KR2009,
they proved that a rational agent weighting equally on “prospective gain-loss
utilities”in both periods is indifferent between the early and later information16.
(2) is the respective utility function from observing early signal for an agent with
constant weight on “prospective gain-loss utility”over periods 17. Their intuition
is: a rational agent is unbiased in the probabilities with which an early signal
will move beliefs up and down. When the sense of loss for immediate and non-
immediate outcomes is equally aversive, the rational agent is indifferent between
16Koszegi and Rabin (2009) built a multi-period model in which γt1,t2 represents the strength of the
concern in period t1 for “prospective gain-loss utility” in period t2. The prospective gain-loss utility stems
from changes in beliefs between last period and this period in beliefs regarding future outcomes. Since
there are only two periods in our model, γt1,t2 is degenerated to γ since γt1,t1 = 1 by their assumption.
17Formally, (2) can be written as∑
s∈S
qsus + η · γ
∑
s∈S
qsµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)
. When γ = 1, it becomes (2)
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early and late information. On the contrary, with freedom in choosing subjective
beliefs, agents exhibit a preference on information timing depending not only on
their discount factor over future, but also on the distribution of the lottery they
are playing with.
D. An Example
This section works out a simple two-state example, to serve as an antidote to
the abstractness of the previous section. In the example, there are two possible
outcomes, x = 0, 1 and u(0) = 0, u(1) = 1 with objective probability p and 1− p
respectively. By holding subjective beliefs q and 1− q, the anticipatory utility at
t=1 is,
UA = Equ(x) = qu(1) + (1− q)u(0)
The prospective gain-loss utility from realised outcomes at t=1 is,
UR = Epµ(u(x)− UA) = pµ(1− q) + (1− p)µ(−q)
Total utility under subjective beliefs is,
UBS = ηp+ (1− ηλ)q + (ηλ− η)pq;
Instead, an unbiased agent has
URE = ηp+ (1− ηλ)p+ (ηλ− η)p2
It is easy to derive from here that the cut-off P ∗ =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) , which is increasing
in η and λ. An agent chooses q > p, thus is over-optimistic if and only if p > P ∗.
Otherwise, she chooses q < p and stays in over-pessimistic if p < P ∗. At p = P ∗,
URE = UBS for any q.
Different from the multiple-state case, the discrete two-state setting has UBS
maximized at q = 1 for p > P ∗, and at q = 0 for p < P ∗ since p rarely equals P ∗
Now, we consider the agent’s timing preference of information.
The agent may receive an early signal i = {0, 1} about her future outcome at
t = 1 and the signal is always correct.
For an agent holding optimal biased beliefs, total utility by observing the early
signal is,
Uearly = q + γηq(1− q)− γηλq(1− q),
where γ is the weight on prospective gain-loss utility following the assumption of
KR2009.
At t = 1, the agent holding biased beliefs believes that with probability q, she
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is going to observe i = 1—leading to an anticipatory utility u(1) with certainty
and a prospective gain compared to her prior q, and, with probability 1− q, she
is going to observe i = 0—leading to an anticipatory utility u(0) with certainty
and a prospective loss. At t=2, as the agent has already updated her reference
point to the right level, there will be no more gain-loss utilities in this period.
Instead, if the agent does not observe the signal, her total utility is the same
as before:
Uwait = q + ηp(1− q)− ληq(1− p).
Hence, when γ = 1 as in KR, observing the signal generates strictly more expected
utility than not observing it if and only if
(3) (q − p)(1− q) > λ(p− q)q.
Since only one side of (3) can be greater than 0, we have,
Uearly > Uwait if and only if q > p, that is p > P
∗. Otherwise, if q < P ∗, then
Uearly < Uwait, the agent will prefer staying uninformed.
This conclusion is intuitive. People being over-optimistic over payoffs are also
over-optimistic in believing that they will get good news. Thus early news pro-
vides additional utility to their anticipation. In the real world, over-optimistic
people are more likely to search for information than over-pessimistic people. This
conclusion contains and further extends KR’s conclusion on timing preference of
information. KR2009 proved that people will be indifferent to the timing of in-
formation, when the sense of loss is exactly as aversive in period 1 as in period
2, that is, γ = 1. Our model repeats their conclusion when agents are rational.
However, with biases in beliefs, individuals will have preferences over timing of
information even if they have equal sense on prospective and realised gain-loss
utilities, and the preferences of early and later information depend on their loss-
aversion attitudes, weights on anticipation against realisation and the real chance
of a good outcome.
For the case γ < 1, it is easy to prove that for people holding q > p , we
have Uearly > Uwait and early information is good; whereas for q < p, Uearly
can be greater, equal to or smaller than Uwait for some value of q. Compared
with the case in which γ = 1, there is a greater chance that people will prefer
early information. KR’s explanation is applicable here as the sense of loss for
non-immediate outcomes is not as intense, so the agent is better off by receiving
the information early. Similar analysis can be applied to q < p.
III. Risk Attitudes
This chapter explores some significant implications of the most fundamental
premise of the model—risk attitudes under subjective beliefs with application to
the choice between two independent lotteries. Chapter 3 has analysed the dis-
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crete multi-state case. The following study extends the previous conclusions by
looking at the case of continuous distributions. The new assumption makes no
changes to conclusions in Chapter 3 while it avoids jumps of subjective expecta-
tion when moving beliefs from one state to another18. To better understand the
effects of reference point on risk attitude, this chapter simply assumes that the
consumption utility takes the linear format u(x) = x, in which case, agents are
risk-neutral in the absence of gain-loss utility. The lottery has continuous distri-
bution which can be symmetrical or skewed. Agents are further categorised into
two types—“naive” and “sophisticated” based on their different cognitive pro-
cesses. Both types form their subjective beliefs as previously stated in Chapter
3, however, when gambling, the “sophisticated” type recognises their cognitive
biases and make decisions accordingly while the “naive” type fails and behaves
like EU maximizer without gain-loss utility. Another rationale for this separation
is due to the discussion given by BP2005, in which they explored the behavioural
implications of the “naive” type under our definition. In their portfolio choice
application, the agent forms optimal subjective beliefs by maximizing the total
intertemporal utility, while chooses optimal investment strategy only to maximize
current anticipation. One straightforward argument is that agent can choose ac-
tions consistent with beliefs in maximizing the total intertemporal utility—leading
to the discussion of sophisticated agents in our model19. Based on the continuity
assumption and classification of agents, this chapter explores the risk attitudes
implications of the model described in Chapter 3.
A. Naive Agent
ASSUMPTION 1: ZA and ZB are the contingent payoffs of two independent
lotteries with continuous probability distribution functions fA(·) and fB(·) respec-
tively.
ASSUMPTION 2: An agent evaluates the payoffs of two lotteries separately and
has optimal subjective beliefs gA(·) and gB(·) which are solutions to the following
problem:
max
gi(·)
Egi(Z) + Efiµ[Z − Egi(Z)], i = A,B.
ASSUMPTION 3: (Naive Agent) For any two lotteries A, B satisfying Assump-
tion 1, a naive agent is the one with optimal beliefs described by Assumption 2
and prefers the lottery with a higher value of:
Max
gi(·)
Egi(·)(Z), i = A,B,
18For example, under discrete multi-state case, a small increase in subjective belief of a high rank state
may or may not change some other states from gain to loss, while the gain-loss switch always happens
to at least one state under continuous distributions.
19Consistent actions are chosen simultaneously with beliefs in the sophisticated case. Since there are
only two periods in our model, we argue that agents can aim at long-term interests maximization in
choosing actions
16 WORKING PAPER JULY 2013
PROPOSITION 5: (Two Symmetrically Distributed Lotteries)
Suppose the assumptions 1-3 hold for two lotteries A and B satisfying: (i) EfA(·)(Z) =
EfB(·)(Z), for fA(·) 6= fB(·);
(ii) ZA and ZB are both symmetrically distributed;
(iii) ZA and ZB satisfy the single-crossing property, that is, if FA(·) and FB(·)
are the cumulative distribution functions for ZA and ZB, there exists z such that
FA(x) < FB(x) for x < z and FA(x) > FB(x) for x > z.
Then,
an agent with a cut-off probability P ∗ ≥ 1 − F (z) prefers lottery A to B since
EgA(·)(Z) > EgB(·)(Z);
an agent with a cut-off probability P ∗ ≤ 1 − F (z) prefers lottery B to A since
EgB(·)(Z) > EgA(·)(Z);
Proposition 5 says that a naive agent with optimal beliefs is risk-seeking if
optimistic and risk-averse if pessimistic Intuitively, low P ∗ implies weak loss-
aversion and less valued future. Loss in the future is therefore bearable in this
case. Higher risk lottery provides better chances of gains on the right tail of the
distribution, which is treated as stronger evidence of a promising payoff by an
optimistic agent—leading to further up-biases. The positive prospect from over-
estimated chances of gains can significantly increase their anticipatory utility,
while the negative prospect from more painful feeling of loss are countered by the
further underestimation of probabilities in the bad outcomes.
For symmetrical distributions with single-crossing property, the risky lottery
gives a higher cumulative probability beyond the crossing point, meaning that the
risky assets promise a higher chance of gain over a certain level of expectation.
Therefore, a naive agent with a low cut-off P ∗ is more up-biased in lotteries with
fat tails.
This proposition implies that a mean-preserved spreading is desirable for an
optimistic agent and undesirable for a pessimistic one even if agents are risk-
neutral under traditional economics definition.
Based on the proof of Proposition 5 and the intuitions described above, we
derive the following lemmas:
LEMMA 1: (Optimistic and pessimistic risk attitude)
For the group of symmetric distributions, a mean-preserving spreading is desirable
for an optimistic agent and undesirable for a pessimistic agent.
LEMMA 2: (Ranking of subjective expectations)
For any distribution, subjective expectation is non-increasing in P ∗.
Furthermore, we consider a more general version of Proposition 5 by relaxing the
requirement on symmetry.
PROPOSITION 6: (Two Lotteries: The General Case)
Consider two independent lotteries A and B with continuous and differentiable
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distribution functions fA(·) 6= fB(·) and EfA(·)(Z) = EfB(·)(Z). For an agent
with cut-off probability P ∗ =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) , we have:
(i) If P 0+A > (<)P
∗, P 0+B < (>)P
∗, then
Eg∗A(Z) > Eg
∗
B
(Z) (Eg∗A(Z) < Eg
∗
B
(Z));
(ii) If P 0+A > (<)P
∗, P 0+B > (<)P
∗, then
Eg∗A(Z) > Eg
∗
B
(Z) (Eg∗A(Z) < Eg
∗
B
(Z))
iff
+∞∫
a
[fA(Z)− fB(Z)]dZ > 0 (
+∞∫
b
[fB(Z)− fA(Z)]dZ > 0),
where a, b, P 0+A, P
0
+B are
P ∗ =
+∞∫
a
fA(Z)dZ =
+∞∫
b
fB(Z)dZ, P
0
+A =
+∞∫
EfA
fA(Z)dZ, P
0
+B =
+∞∫
EfB
fB(Z)dZ.
Notice that a and b in Proposition 6 are the subjective expectations under
optimal beliefs. Since optimal expectations are set at the level to ensure the
cumulative probability above it equals P ∗, a and b are also indicators of the
distribution skewness. For any given P ∗, a higher value of a means a fatter “right
tail” of the distribution and therefore a negative skewness20. As long as the mean
remains the same, an optimistic agent has a decreasing preference to lotteries as
the skewness of distribution changes from negative to positive.
B. Sophisticated Agent
ASSUMPTION 4: (Sophisticated Agent) For any two lotteries A and B satisfy-
ing Assumption 1, a sophisticated agent is the one with optimal beliefs described
by Assumption 2 and prefers the lottery with higher value of
Max
gi(·)
Egi(Z) + Efiµ[Z − Egi(Z)], i = A,B,
PROPOSITION 7: (Choice between Two Lotteries: Sophisticated Case)
If assumptions 1,2, and 4 hold, then for any two risky lotteries with fA(·) 6= fB(·),
a sophisticated agent strictly prefers lottery A to B iff∫ +∞
EgA
fA(Z)ZdZ + λ
∫ EgA
−∞
fA(Z)ZdZ >
∫ +∞
EgB
fB(Z)ZdZ + λ
∫ EgB
−∞
fB(Z)ZdZ
20The “right tail” does not only refer to the tail of a distribution. It represents the area under the
p.d.f. from the subjective expectation controlled by P ∗ to the right limit.
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Specifically, for two risky lotteries with equal objective expectation, i.e., EfA(·)(Z) =
EfB(·)(Z), a sophisticated agent prefers lottery A to B iff,∫ EgA
−∞
fA(Z)ZdZ >
∫ EgB
−∞
fB(Z)ZdZ
As we can see from Proposition 7, the objective function of a sophisticated agent
is just the expectation under rational beliefs but weighting the loss region with
λ. Without loss aversion, i.e., λ = 1, the objective function of an sophisticated
agent is simplified to the ordinary rational expectation.
Proposition 7 indicates that a sophisticated agent behaves similarly to a ra-
tional agent who maximizes her expectation with unbiased beliefs. There is no
surprising for this conclusion since a sophisticated agent considers both the an-
ticipation and the deterioration in realization from the “reference effect” . Here,
the “reference effect” denotes the deduction in realized utility coming from com-
paring an outcome with the anticipation(reference point). We notice that the
direct effects from subjective beliefs, i.e., anticipatory utility, is eliminated by the
“reference effect” at optimal beliefs as we prove in Appendix A. Intuitively, if the
anticipation is too high, then the “reference effect” gives too many chances of
loss. Since the agent is loss averse, decrease in total utility due to more states of
loss exceeds the increase in anticipatory utility. Therefore, lower anticipation is
beneficial. On the other hand, with low anticipation, few chances of loss makes
the punishment from the “reference effect” insignificant. Since people discount
the future utility, benefits from higher anticipation will exceed the decrease in
future realised utility. At optimal beliefs, illusions from subjective beliefs on an-
ticipation and reference point cancel out each other, leaving only the truth of the
contingency.
Our objective function here deviates from the rational expectation only in the
loss region. This difference comes directly from the assumption of loss aversion
since loss averse agent overweighs the bad outcomes below their expectation.
IV. Application: Portfolio Choice
This chapter explores some implications of the model in the investment problem—
a biased investor with concave utility function chooses the optimal portfolio con-
sisting of a risky asset and a risk-free asset. Following the assumption made in
Chapter 4, we assume that there exist two types of investors: the naive ones who
maximize the expected return and the sophisticated ones who maximize the to-
tal utility including both the anticipatory and prospective gain-loss utilities. We
points out that the naive investor and the sophisticated investor can adopt oppo-
site investment strategies even though they form their subjective beliefs through
the same cognitive process. An equilibrium is further derived in a market with
identical investors to look into the implications on asset pricing.
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A. Choice between one risk-free asset and one risky asset
ASSUMPTION 5: The return of an asset has a continuous distribution function
f(·) defined over (−∞,+∞). The investor holds subjective belief g(·) of the asset’s
return, which is also a continuous p.d.f. on (−∞,+∞).
There are two assets in the market: a risk-free asset with return Rf ; and a risky
asset with gross return RR = Rf + Rm = Rf + Ef(·)(R), where Rm is the gross
excess return, R the realised excess return. Investors have unlimited access to the
risk-free asset and the price of the risk-free asset is 0. The consumption utility
takes the same assumption as in Chapter 3: u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) ≤ 0. There are
two periods. At t=1, the agent forms her subjective optimal beliefs g(R) about
payoffs of the risky asset and allocates her unit endowment between these two
assets. In the second period, the payoffs of the assets are realised.
Following our previous categorisation of “naive” and “sophisticated” agents, we
assume that the naive type has different objective functions in choosing optimal
beliefs and optimal α. The choice of portfolio is “rational” based on their biased
beliefs. The sophisticated type chooses optimal subjective beliefs and optimal α
allocated to the risky asset simultaneously.
To be more specific, at t=1, for any given optimal beliefs g(R), the naive agent
chooses her portfolio share, αBS allocated to the risky asset to maximize the
expected return:
Max
α
∫ +∞
−∞
g(R)u(Rf + αR)dR.
Given the optimal choice of αBS , the naive agent chooses her subjective beliefs
g(·) to solve:
argmax
g(R)
Eg(R)u(Rf + α
BSR) + Ef(R)µ[u(Rf + α
BSR)− Eg(R)u(Rf + αBSR)]
Instead, a sophisticated agent chooses her optimal portfolio share α and optimal
beliefs g(R) simultaneously to solve:
argmax
g(R), α
Eg(R)u(Rf + αR) + Ef(R)µ[u(Rf + αR)− Eg(R)u(Rf + αR)]
Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) built a discrete model in which an agent has
optimal beliefs determined by
argmax
{qs}
S
Σ
s=1
qsu(Rf + α
BSRs) +
S
Σ
s=1
psu(Rf + α
BSR),
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where αBS is the solution to max
α
S
Σ
s=1
qsu(Rf +αRs). This is a special case of the
naive agent in our model when λ = 1 and η =
1
2
.
BP2005 concluded that optimal-belief holders always trade more aggressively
than rational agents since the cost from distorted portfolio choice is second order
while the benefit from a higher anticipation is first order.
The following proposition indicates that reference-dependent loss-averse in-
vestors no longer trade aggressively all the time. Even though the cost of distorted
portfolio is still second order, biased beliefs not only generate first-order benefits
from higher anticipation, but also give first-order punishment from the “reference
effect” . Therefore, agents in our model take aggressive or conservative trading
strategy depending on their optimistic and pessimistic attitudes.
Naive Agent. —
PROPOSITION 8: (Risk Taking due to Optimism and Pessimism: Naive Case):
An optimistic investor with low P ∗ invests more aggressively than a rational in-
vestor or in the opposite direction; a pessimistic investor with high P ∗ invests in
the same direction as the rational investor but more conservatively:
if E(R) > 0, then αRE > 0,
αOP > αRE > 0 or αOP < 0 < αRE ; 0 < αPE < αRE .
If E(R) < 0, then αRE < 0,
αOP < αRE < 0 or αOP > 0 > αRE ; αRE < αPE < 0.
Similar to BP2005, the optimal αBS under biased beliefs is always different from
αRE since biased beliefs ensure higher total welfare as proved in Proposition 1.
Besides, the optimistic investor trades in the same direction but more aggressively
than a rational agent since she overestimates the chance of good returns21; or she
enters into a position opposite to the rational strategy. As stated at the beginning
of this chapter, the investor in BP’s model can be described as an optimistic agent
with P ∗ = 0 in our model and the behavioural implication on an optimistic agent
here can also be explained by BP’s intuition: opposite trading happens when the
asset is skewed enough in the opposite direction of the mean payoff.
Different from BP’s conclusion, the investor in our model no longer always
holds “optimistic” beliefs and invests aggressively. Instead, a pessimistic investor
characterised by a high P ∗ invests in the same direction but more conservatively
21Returns are good or bad conditional on the long-short position. A positive return is good conditional
on long and is bad conditional on short.
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than her rational counterpart22. Agents in BP’s model always trade aggressively
because the additional anticipation is a pure generator of felicity23. Although
optimism and pessimism are both punished for distorted portfolio choices, the
former dominates the latter because up-biases provide extra felicity from the
higher anticipation whereas down-biases do not.
Moreover, an agent with a low P ∗ in our model tends to overestimate the chance
of good returns24 no matter they have a short or long position. However, attitudes
can also be strategy-dependent—the same person in a long position can exhibit an
attitude opposite to that when she shorts. For example, facing a negative skewed
asset with E(R) < 0, an investor enters into a short position will be pessimistic
since the long tail on the left gives few chances of gains; the same investor in the
long position instead can be optimistic, since the fat tail on the right gives high
chance of gain. The choice of attitudes depends on the investment position as
well as the skewness of the risky asset.
Finally, we point out that our conclusion partially depends on the construction
of the optimization problem. By assuming that the agent takes beliefs as given
when making portfolio choice and fails to recognise her biases, we implicitly indi-
cate, in a non-strict way, that the agent in our model chooses α after she chooses
her beliefs. Therefore, the deviation of α from rational level, like BP said, only
puts on second order cost whereas changes in beliefs introduce first order increase
in anticipation hence dominate the total effects. However, an agent can behave
more complicatedly than the described naive type—when choosing the optimal
portfolio, she realises her biases in beliefs and makes her investment decision ac-
cordingly. In the following part, we discuss the behaviour of a sophisticated agent
in the portfolio choice problem.
Sophisticated Agent. —
PROPOSITION 9: (Risk Taking due to Optimism and Pessimism: Sophisticated
Case):
(i) Sophisticated investors invest more aggressively than rational investors if the
average return conditional on loss is good enough. In other cases, sophisti-
cated investors invest either more conservatively or in the opposite direction
to the rational strategy.
22“Optimistic” and “pessimistic” are defined differently from Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). BP’s
“pessimistic” investor assigns higher probabilities to negative returns while shorting the asset. “Pes-
simistic” defined in this model means “conservative” : pessimistic investors assign lower probabilities to
negative returns while still shorting.
23Mathematically, BP’s model requires αBS > αRE > 0 because their first order maximization prob-
lem requires this condition. The envelope condition is (us′′ −us′ )∆pˆi+ ηΣpsu′(Rf +αBSRs)Rs∆α = 0.
When αRE > αBS > 0, Σpsu′(Rf + αBSRs)Rs > 0, then bias in beliefs serves as a utility pump thus
gives no limits to bias.
24Whether a return is good or bad is conditional on the position of the asset, i.e., a positive return is
good conditional on long and bad conditional on short.
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If E(R) > (<)0 and
∫
−BS
f(R)u′(Rf + αRER)RdR > (<)0, then,
αBS > αRE > 0(αBS < αRE < 0).
If E(R) > (<)0 and
∫
−BS
f(R)u′(Rf + αRER)RdR < (>)0, then
αBS < αRE(αBS > αRE)
where αBS and αRE are the optimal allocation of wealth on risky assets and
“-BS” indicates the region of loss under biased beliefs taking αRE as given.
(ii) αBS decreases in P ∗ if RCE > 0;
αBS increases in P ∗ if RCE < 0,
where Eg(·)u(Rf + αR) = u(Rf + αRCE) and Rf + RCE is the certainty
equivalent .
The behaviour of sophisticated agents is more complicated as described by
proposition 9. Like our analysis in Chapter 4, a sophisticated agent considers
both anticipation and the “reference effect” in making her portfolio choice. At
optimal beliefs, these two effects cancel out each other, leaving only rational-
like expected utility. Unlike naive agents, the biased beliefs no longer determine
actions directly through expectation, but they still affect actions through the
choice of reference point which determines the sensitivity towards future payoffs.
Basically, optimism, by introducing in more losses, also makes an agent more
sensitive towards outcomes while pessimism, by reducing the fear of loss, makes
an agent less sensitive to outcomes.
The first part of Proposition 9 describes the difference in portfolio choice strate-
gies between a sophisticated and a rational agent, which lies in whether they
overweigh the returns in loss region. The intuition is simple: compared with a
rational agent, a loss-averse agent cares more about low-rank outcomes. There-
fore, when low-rank returns are good on average, loss-averse agents are happier
than the rational ones and more willing to take excess risks. On the other hand,
bad returns on the low-rank outcomes are more painful for loss-averse agents thus
lead to conservative or opposite trading strategy.
The second part of Proposition 9 examines the effects of optimistic and pes-
simistic attitudes on investment strategies. To understand the intuition more
clearly, consider the following lemma directly derived from Proposition 9 part
(ii).
LEMMA 3: Optimistic agents invest more aggressively than pessimistic agents
when the return is perceived to be good;
Pessimistic agents invest more aggressively than optimistic agents when the return
is perceived to be bad. That is,
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for αBS > (<)0 and RCE > 0, we have,
αOP > αPE > 0(αPE < αOP < 0);
for αBS > (<)0 and RCE < 0, we have,
αPE > αOP > 0(αOP < αPE < 0).
To better understand the intuition, consider the following example. Suppose
there is an investor in the long position of a security and suppose the security
gives good returns on average in the future which is known by the investor. An
optimistic investor who takes her large chance of future loss into consideration
cares more about the returns due to her fear of loss. Since loss is the source of
intensive feelings compared to gains, more attention to the asset gives stronger
feeling on returns. Hence, when returns are good in general, an optimistic investor
is happier than a pessimistic one and is willing to hold more risky asset.
On the contrary, pessimism reduces the fear for loss and makes the agent less
sensitive, thus care less about future outcomes . Therefore, when the asset is a
bad one, pessimism and numbness make the bad outcomes more tolerable and
the pessimistic agents can bear extra risks than optimistic ones.
Compared with the bad-return situation, when the asset gives good return as in
the first case, even though staying numb can make pessimistic ones avoid intensive
feelings from bad outcomes, there is little chance to feel bad since the asset is a
good one in general. Therefore, optimism is more beneficial because it intensifies
the happiness and enables optimistic investors to bear more risks than pessimistic
ones.
B. Equilibrium
In this section, we place the portfolio choice problem in an exchange economy
with two assets, a free risk-free one with Rf = 0 and price pif = 0 and a risky
one with stochastic excess return R and price pi. The distribution of R is publicly
known. We assume the short-sale constraint binds, thus the proportion of wealth
allocated to the risky asset α satisfies 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We further simplify the
assumption by making utility function take the linear format: u(x) = x.
The simplest candidate equilibrium is a homogeneous holdings equilibrium: an
equilibrium in which investors are identical to each other and hold the same port-
folio. As we prove later, the optimal portfolios for both naive and sophisticated
agents are either only risky asset or only risk-free asset under the linear utility
function assumption. Hence, the equilibrium price which is constructed by such
kind of portfolio choice must ensure investors are indifferent between two assets.
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Naive. — Previous problem of a naive agent under the new assumption becomes:
g∗(R) = argmax
g(R)
+∞∫
−∞
g(R)(Rf+α
∗R)dR+
+∞∫
−∞
f(R)[Rf+α
∗R−
+∞∫
−∞
g(r)(Rf+α
∗r)dr]dR
α∗ = argmax
α∈[0,1]
+∞∫
−∞
g∗(R)(Rf + αR)dR,
It is obvious from the optimization problem that for Rf = 0, we have,
α∗ = 1 if Eg∗(R) ≥ 0;
α∗ = 0 if Eg∗(R) ≤ 0.
In equilibrium, the price of the risky asset piN at t = 1 must satisfy Rf =
ηEg∗(R)− piN . The equilibrium price is therefore,
pi∗N = ηEg∗(R)
Instead, in a market with rational unbiased EU maximizers, the equilibrium price
of the risky asset at t=1 is,
pi∗RE = ηEf (R).
Sophisticated. — Now consider the security pricing if investors are sophisticated.
The optimization problem is defined by,
max
g(R),α
+∞∫
−∞
g(R)[Rf + αR]dR +
+∞∫
−∞
f(R){Rf + αR−
+∞∫
−∞
g(r)[Rf + αrdr}dR
From the first order condition with respect to α, we have,
α = 1 if
+∞∫
−∞
f(R)RdR + (λ− 1) ∫ Eg∗−∞ f(R)RdR− piS > Rf ;
α = 0 if
+∞∫
−∞
f(R)RdR + (λ− 1) ∫ Eg∗−∞ f(R)RdR− piS < Rf .
In equilibrium, the price of the risky asset piS must satisfy
+∞∫
−∞
f(R)RdR + (λ− 1)
∫ Eg∗
−∞
f(R)RdR− piS = Rf = 0
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Therefore, the equilibrium price for a market with identical sophisticated agents is
pi∗S = ηEf (R) + η(λ− 1)
∫ Eg∗
−∞
f(R)RdR.
To gain further intuition on the equilibrium, consider a normal distributed
asset with R ∼ N(1, 1). λ is set to 2.25 as suggested by experimental evidence .
Variation in η changes P ∗ from 0 to 125. The result is shown in Figure1.
Figure 1. EQUILIBRIUM PRICE pi∗ AS A FUNCTION OF P ∗
The solid line in Figure 1 plots the rational price as a function of P ∗. Since P ∗
is increasing in η, the equilibrium price increases to rational expectation as the
discount rate η goes to 1. The dash line plots the equilibrium price against P ∗
in a market with naive investors. Consistent with the prediction of Proposition
8 and since the short-sale constraint binds , the equilibrium price of the risky
asset decreases as investors become more pessimistic. To be more specific, the
“naive” price is higher than the rational level when the market is dominated by
optimistic investors because the up-biased beliefs urge the investors to hold more
risky asset. Instead, the “naive” price falls below rational level when investors are
pessimistic. Pessimistic investors require higher equity premium to compensate
for their stronger aversion to loss.
25λ and η can change simultaneously, however, for calibration purpose, we set lambda at 2.25.
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The dotted line plots the “sophisticated” equilibrium price as a function of P ∗.
Compared with the “naive” market, the sophisticated price exhibits a U-shaped
patten rather than strictly decreasing in P ∗. The equilibrium price is upper
bounded by the rational expectation reflecting our conclusion that sophisticated
agents act similarly to rational agents. Moreover, consistent with the prediction of
Proposition9, both the optimistic and the “very” pessimistic agents price the asset
higher than moderate pessimistic agents. With short-sale constraint, optimistic
agents for this symmetrically distributed asset are those with P ∗ < 0.5 while
pessimistic agents have P ∗ > 0.5. Since µ = 1, ROPCE = Eg(R) > 0 and utility
increases as agents become more optimistic, so does the price. The average return
captured by the optimistic agents is always greater than 0, therefore, the asset is a
good one and the higher reference point intensify the happiness for good returns.
On the contrary, for “extremely” pessimistic agents (in this case, P ∗ > 0.63),
they have RPECE = Eg(R) < 0 and the risky asset becomes more appealing as
agents turn to be more pessimistic. As the return of the asset is not good enough
for those very pessimistic agents to bias up, it is subjectively captured to be bad.
Further pessimism reduces sensitivity toward bad returns and increases tolerance
of risks.
Finally, “moderately” pessimistic agents who have 0.5 < P ∗ < 0.63 in this
example, correctly capture the goodness of the asset, that is they have RPECE =
Eg(R) > 0. They are pessimistic because the asset fails to give sufficient chance
of good returns to persuade them to be optimistic. By being more pessimistic,
they reduce the deserved happiness from good outcomes instead of reducing the
painfulness from bad outcomes. Therefore, they are the most “risk-averse” ones
among these three groups.
Furthermore, rational price is lower than “sophisticated” price when investors
are optimistic and exceeds the latter as investors become more pessimistic. Con-
sistent with the first part of Proposition 9, since µ > 0, the average return of
the loss region increases from negative to positive as confidence increases. Conse-
quently, intensive feelings on bad returns push down the sophisticated price when
market is pessimistic and boost it up when the market is optimistic.
V. Conclusion
This thesis develops a model of optimal judgemental biases with reference point.
The model gives an insight into the rationale of over-optimism and over-pessimism
by applying two behavioural assumptions—reference dependent utility and loss
aversion into an intertemporal model. Contrary to previous literatures on refer-
ence dependent utility models in which it is usually assumed that utility is derived
from beliefs, in our model, beliefs are optimally determined by the inverse process
through utility maximization. Our model setting internalizes the over and under
confidence commonly observed without employing the ad hoc parameter control-
ling optimistic and pessimistic attitudes. Applying the model to the preference
of information timing sheds lights on the information-seeking behaviour of indi-
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viduals holding biased beliefs; another example in the context of portfolio choice
shows that pessimism can lead to conservative trading but can also encourage
risk-taking investment strategy.
As part of the optimal beliefs literature, the model we built in this thesis is still
open to the critiques of Spiegler (2008) on the violation of IIA, since beliefs are
payoff dependent. Further amendments might require preferences to be choice-
set dependent—the same element in different choice bundles need to be viewed as
different subjects. Moreover, the set of optimal beliefs in our model is not unique.
Although the results are compatible with cumulative prospect theory and other
theories on ambiguity, our model cannot provide explanations to phenomenon like
“curse of knowledge”
footnoteThe curse of knowledge is a cognitive bias according to which better-
informed agents may have the disadvantage that they lose some ability to under-
stand less-informed agents. As such added information may convey some disu-
tility, the curse of knowledge implies that the well-informed party, in our model,
with a great chance of getting good results, are more likely to be pessimistic
instead of optimistic as we predicted.. One possible solution to this problem is
to further assume a reference-dependent anticipation. Reference-dependent an-
ticipation assumption can be valid in the circumstances when agents have fresh
recently experience 26. Calibration results indicate that with concave utility func-
tion, model with reference point may better fit the observations.
Future work may include modelling of preference on information containing
uncertainty. Agents in our model are motivated to choose subjective beliefs devi-
ated from rational ones due to the fear of loss and the appeal of goodwill. Biased
beliefs regarding information containing uncertainty is one step further. However,
Bayes rule can hardly hold here since beliefs are utility-serving. A simple rule of
updating beliefs with economics intuitions is worth exploring. Finally, the equi-
librium we describe in this thesis is incomplete. A more general equilibrium can
be constructed based on both our current homogeneous assumption as well as an
alternative one that investors holding heterogeneous beliefs trade with each other
in the market.
Mathematical Appendix A
Proposition 1: (Biased Beliefs are Preferred to Rational Unbiased
Beliefs)
U =
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈S
psµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
26Another example to support this assumption is an amateur and a professional chess players having
different levels of felicities from the same anticipation.
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For k=1,....,S
∂U
∂qk
= uk{1− η
∑
s∈S
psµ
′(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
= uk{1− ηP+ − ηλ(1− P+)}
where P+ =
∑
A
ps, A = {s ∈ S : us −
∑
s∈S
qsus ≥ 0}.
For
∂U
∂qk
|p1,...pS 6= 0 (for at least one k), the conclusion holds obviously.
Consider the case that
∂U
∂qk
|p1,...pS = 0, ∀k ∈ S.
∂U
∂qk
|p1,...pS = 0 holds for all k, iff P+ =
∑
A0
ps =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) , A
0 = {s ∈ S :
us −
∑
s∈S
psus ≥ 0}.
Therefore, we have
UBS =
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈A
psus − (
∑
s∈A
ps) ·
∑
s∈S
qsus + λ ·
∑
s∈A
psus − λ · (
∑
s∈A
ps) ·
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
= η{
∑
s∈A
psus + λ ·
∑
s∈A
psus}
The total utility is independent of qs and UBS ≡ URE . Q.E.D.
Proposition 2: (Beliefs Tradeoff among Different States)
Consider the following maximization problem
max
qs,s=1,...S
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈S
psµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
s.t.
∑
s∈S
qs = 1.
From
∂U
∂qk
= uk{1− ηP+ − ηλ(1− P+)}, we see that, for uk > 0, U is increasing
in qk iff P+ > P
∗ and is decreasing in qk iff P+ < P ∗, where P ∗ =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) .
The constraint
∑
s∈S
qs = 1 requires that any increase in qk must come together
with decrease(s) in subjective probability(ies) of other states. For simplification,
consider the case that qk and ql (k > l) change together. Suppose P+ > P
∗ and
all the other subjective beliefs are given, since uk > ul for all k > l,
∂U
∂qk
>
∂U
∂ql
.
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A small increase in qk with a small decrease in ql will increase the total utility.
Similar analysis for the case P+ < P
∗. Our proof replicates but simplifies the
proof using Kahn-Tucker condition. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3:(Over-optimistic versus Over-pessimistic)
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that for P+ 6= P ∗, further biases are
always desirable. Therefore, at optimal beliefs, P+ = P
∗ =
ηλ− 1
η(λ− 1) . Since the
optimal P+ is uniquely determined by η and λ, and the objective probabilities
are exogenous, the set of us above the expectation is also uniquely determined.
Even though the value of
∑
s∈S
qsus is given, there still exist multiple combinations
of {qs}. As long as sets of {qs} generate the required value of
∑
s∈S
qsus, they will
all achieve the same value of total utility.
Further more, directly from proof of Proposition 2, we see that if P 0+ > (<)P
∗,
the decision maker will be up-biased(down-biased) in the upper-rank outcomes
and down-biased(up-biased) in the lower-rank outcomes. Therefore,
∑
s∈S
qsus >
(<)
∑
s∈S
psus iff P
0
+ > (<)P
∗. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4: (Information Timing Preference)
Suppose an agent holds optimal subjective beliefs {qs}s∈S .
If i = k, the agent knows that Zk will happen at t=2. Then, at t=1, U
A
k =
uk+ηµ(uk−
∑
s∈S
qsus); at t=2, U
R
k = 1×ηµ(uk−uk)+0×
∑
s∈S/k
ηµ(us−
∑
s∈S
qsus) = 0.
The total utility from observing i = k is,
Uk = U
A
k + U
R
k = uk + ηµ(uk −
∑
s∈S
qsus),
The agent’s prospective utility from getting information in advance is,
Uearly =
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈S
qsµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}.
Utility without early information is as before,
Uwait =
∑
s∈S
qsus + η{
∑
s∈S
psµ(us −
∑
s∈S
qsus)}
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Early information is strictly preferred iff Uearly > Uwait holds. Since
Uearly −Uwait = η · {
∑
s∈A
(qs− ps) · (us−
∑
s∈S
qsus) +
∑
s∈A
(qs− ps) · λ(us−
∑
s∈S
qsus)},
Uearly > Uwait iff
(A1)
∑
s∈A
(qs − ps) · (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus) > λ
∑
s∈A
(ps − qs) · (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus).
For s ∈ A, where A = {s ∈ S : u(Zs) −
∑
s∈S
qsu(Zs) ≥ 0}, (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus) ≥ 0 by
definition; and for s ∈ A, (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus) < 0.
If P 0+ > (<)P
∗, by Proposition 3, qs − ps ≥ (≤)0 if s ∈ A while ps − qs ≥ (≤)0
if s ∈ A, strict inequality holds for at least one s in each subset. Therefore, only
one of
∑
s∈A
(qs − ps) · (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus) > 0 and
∑
s∈A
(ps − qs) · (us −
∑
s∈S
qsus) > 0 can
hold.
When P 0+ > P
∗, LHS of A1 is greater than 0, and Uearly > Uwait; when P+ < P ∗,
RHS of A1 is greater than 0, and Uearly < Uwait. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5,6: (Two Symmetrically Distributed Lotteries & Two Lot-
teries: The General Case)
We prove the general case in Proposition 6. Proposition 5 can be easily derived
from Proposition 6.
We start with part(ii) in Proposition 6 and prove the case P 0+A > P
∗, P 0+B < P
∗.
The case P 0+A < P
∗, P 0+B > P
∗ holds by symmetry.
From Proposition 3, if P 0+A > P
∗ and P 0+B < P
∗, then an agent is on average
over-optimistic about the payoff of the lottery A, and over-pessimistic about the
payoff of the lottery B. Therefore, we have,
Eg∗
B(·)(ZB) < EfB(·)(ZB) = EfA(·)(ZA) < Eg
∗
A(·)(ZA)
For a naive agent, lottery A is strictly preferred to lottery B.
Consider part(i), in which case either both P 0+A and P
0
+B are greater than P
∗ or
both smaller than P ∗. Notice that optimal belief g∗i (·) ensures that
+∞∫
a
fA(Z)dZ =
P ∗,
+∞∫
b
fB(Z)dZ = P
∗,
where a = min{ZA : ZA −
+∞∫
−∞
g∗A(ZA)ZAdZA ≥ 0} = Eg∗A(ZA),
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and b = min{ZB : ZB −
+∞∫
−∞
g∗B(ZB)ZBdZB ≥ 0} = Eg∗B (ZB).
Hence, if a > b, Eg∗A(ZA) > Eg
∗
B
(ZB) and
+∞∫
a
[fA(Z)− fB(Z)]dZ > 0.
Similar proof for the case a < b. It is easy to derive Proposition 5 from here.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 7:(Choice between Two Lotteries: Sophisticated Case)
The objective function U = Eg(Z) + ηEfµ[Z − Eg(Z)] can be reformed as,
U =
∫ +∞
Eg(Z)
f(Z)ZdZ + λ
∫ Eg(Z)
−∞
f(Z)ZdZ
= ηEf (Z) + (1− η)Eg(Z) + (λ− 1)η
∫
loss
f(Z)Eg(Z)dZ + (λ− 1)η
∫
loss
f(Z)ZdZ.
At optimal beliefs, we have
∫
loss
f(Z)dZ = 1−P ∗ = 1− η
η(λ− 1) . Substitute
1− η
η(λ− 1)
back into the reformed objective function, we have,
ηEf (Z) + (λ− 1)η
∫
loss
f(Z)ZdZ
Since EfA(ZA) = EfB (ZB), our conclusions hold obviously. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8:(Risk Taking due to Optimism and Pessimism: Naive
Case)
The agent aims to maximize
∫
u(Rf + αR)dF(R). The objective function is con-
cave in α as
∫
u′′(Rf + αR)R2dF(R) ≤ 0. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, if α is optimal, it must
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker first order condition:
φ(α) =
∫
u′(Rf + αR)RdF(R){ ≤ 0 if α < 1≥ 0 if α > 0 .
Notice that
∫
RdF (R) > 0 implies φ(0) > 0. Hence, α = 0 cannot satisfy the
first order condition. We conclude that the optimal portfolio has α > 0. Same
analogy can be applied in the case E(R) < 0.
The proof below is presented in the discrete multi-state case to make mathemat-
ical expressions clear. All steps are applicable to the continuous distribution.
The problem of a biased agent to choose αBS for given {qs}s∈S is
Max
α
∑
s∈S
qsu(Rf + αRs).
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FOC of this problem is ∑
s∈S
qsu
′(Rf + αBSRs) = 0,
where αBS is the optimal allocation of wealth to the risky asset under biased
beliefs.
We examine the agent’s FOC for optimal α∗. Consider moving dωˆ from state s′
to state s′′ with R′′s > R′s, we have:
(u′(Rf + α∗R′′s)R
′′
s − u′(Rf + α∗R′s)R′s)dωˆ +
∑
s∈S
qˆsu
′′(Rf + α∗Rs)R2sdα
∗ = 0
dα∗
dωˆ
=
u′(·)R′s − u′(·)R′′s∑
s∈S qsu′′(Rf + α∗Rs)R2s
> 0.
Therefore, optimal α∗ is increasing in the subjective probabilities putting on
upper-ranking outcomes. From Proposition 2, an optimistic agent is up-biased
because she overestimates the probabilities of good outcomes and underestimates
the probabilities of bad outcomes. For αBS > 0, better outcomes refer to the
states with higher positive returns, while for αBS < 0, better outcomes refer to
the states with lower negative returns. For αRE > 0 and αBS > 0, an optimistic
agent is one who overestimates the probabilities on positive returns. To bring
down the biased beliefs from optimistic level to rational level, α must decrease.
Therefore, we have αOP > αRE > 0. Instead, a pessimistic agent who overes-
timates the probabilities on the low returns needs to increase α to get beliefs
back to the rational level. Hence, we have 0 < αPE < αRE . For αRE > 0 and
αBS < 0, probabilities on low returns are overestimated by an optimistic agent
and α must increase to get beliefs back to the rational level. For this reason, we
have αOP < 0 < αRE . For a pessimistic agent with αPE < 0, αRE < αPE < 0
leads to a contradiction to the assumption that αRE > 0. Our proof for αRE > 0
is completed. Similar analysis can be applied in the case αRE < 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9:(Risk Taking due to Optimism and Pessimism: Sophis-
ticated Case)
The problem of choosing optimal αBS for given optimal beliefs {q∗s}s∈S is,
Max
α
U =
∑
s∈S
q∗su(Rf + αRs) + η
∑
s∈S
psµ[u(Rf + αRs)−
∑
s∈S
q∗su(Rf + αRs)]
We proved in Proposition 8 that if E(R) > (<)0 then αRE > (<)0. The first
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order condition with respect to α at optimal beliefs is
∂U
∂α
|α,qs=q∗s= η
∑
s∈S
psu
′(·)Rs + η(λ− 1)
∑
−BS
psu
′(·)Rs = 0
Instead, the first order condition with respect to α for a rational agent is
∂U
∂α
|α,qs=ps=
∑
s∈S
psu
′(·)Rs = 0.
Since
∂2U
∂α2
=
∑
qsu
′′(·)R2s < 0, if αRE > 0 and η(λ− 1)
∑
−BS
psu
′(·)Rs > 0, then
∂U
∂α
|α=αRE ,qs=q∗s> 0.
We must have αBS > αRE > 0.
Instead, when αRE > 0 and η(λ− 1) ∑
−BS
psu
′(·)Rs < 0, since
∂U
∂α
|α=αRE ,qs=q∗s< 0,
we must have αBS < αRE and the proof for the case αRE > 0 is completed.
Conclusions for αRE < 0 can be proved by the same logic.
Next, we need to prove the second part of the proposition. First we assume
that at optimal beliefs, the subjective expectation is Eq∗su(Rf + αRs). Consider
moving dωˆ > 0 from state s′ to s′′ with Rs′′ > Rs′ . Suppose with no change in α,
the new subjective expectation is Eq∗su(Rf + αRs) + ∆, where ∆ = dωˆ(u(Rf +
αRs′′) − u(Rf + αRs′)). Suppose ∆ is small enough such that only one state s˜
moves from gain to loss due to the increase in expectation. This assumption is
always satisfied under the continuous distribution assumption. We examine the
FOC for the optimal α:
η(λ− 1)ps˜(dωˆ)u′(Rf + αRs˜)Rs˜ + η(λ− 1) Σ−BSpsu
′′(Rf + αRs)R2s}dα = 0
Since η Σ
s∈S
psu
′′(Rf +αRs)R2s + η(λ− 1) Σ−BSpsu
′′(Rf +αRs)R2s < 0, for dα > 0,
we must have η(λ− 1)ps˜u′(Rf + αRs˜)Rs˜ > 0 and Rs˜ > 0.
Instead, if Rs˜ < 0, we need the down-bias −dωˆ to move η(λ − 1)ps˜u′(Rf +
αRs˜)Rs˜ out of the loss region. Notice that the certain state moving into or out of
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the loss region is the one on the margin of the gain and loss regions. Therefore,
u(Rf + αRs˜) = Eq∗su(Rf + αRs).
With a small change in denotation, we can get Rs˜ = RCE in our proposition.
We proved that if RCE > 0, α is increasing in dωˆ; if RCE < 0, α is decreas-
ing in dωˆ. The final conclusion and Lemma 3 can be easily derived from here.
Q.E.D.
Mathematical Appendix B
Appendix B presents the model in Chapter 3 by relaxing the linear restriction
on the gain-loss utility µ(x).
Specifically, we assume
µ′(−x) = λ(x)µ′(x),
where λ(x) > 1, x > 0, and lim
x→0
λ(x) = 1, µ′′(x) ≤ 0, λ′(x) ≤ 0. Conclusions
under the new assumption are similar to those in Chapter 3.
All the optimal conditions below are derived from the FOC: ∂U∂qs = 0, where
U = Σ
s∈S
qsu(Zs) + η Σ
s∈S
psµ[u(Zs)− Σ
s∈S
qsu(Zs)].
Previous conclusions under linear assumption in Proposition 3 are:
For µ(x) = x (x > 0), µ(x) = λx (x < 0),
(i) Linear: Two-state Case
P ∗ = ηλ−1η(λ−1) = 1 +
η−1
η(λ−1) is independent of q.
Optimal q is: q∗ = 0, if p < P ∗; q∗ = 1, if p > P ∗.
(ii) Linear: S-state Case
Optimal {q∗s}s∈S satisfy: P+ = P ∗ = ηλ−1η(λ−1) , where P+ = Σ
A
ps, A = {s ∈
S : u(Zs)− Σ
s∈S
qsu(Zs) ≥ 0}, and P ∗ is independent of qs. Therefore, there
exist more than one optimal set of {q∗s}s∈S , and they all achieve a certain
value of Σ
s∈S
q∗su(Zs)(for given{u(Zs)}s), which is uniquely determined by
P ∗ = ηλ−1η(λ−1) for given {ps}s∈S . (Conclusions from Proposition 3).
Next, we discuss the model under new assumptions.
We assume µ′(−x) = λ(x)µ′(x), where λ(x) > 1, x > 0, and lim
x→0
λ(x) = 1,
µ′′(x) ≤ 0, λ′(x) ≤ 0.
(i) General: Two-state Case
Suppose we have two states with u(1) = 1, u(0) = 0.
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From FOC, we can derive p = 1 + ηµ
′(1−q)−1
η[µ′(q)λ(q)−µ′(1−q)]
Since 0 < p < 1 and ηµ
′(1−q)−1
η[µ′(q)λ(q)−µ′(1−q)] < 0, the denominator and the nu-
merator must have opposite signs.
For λ′(x) ≤ 0, the cut-off value ηµ′(1−q)−1η[µ′(q)λ(q)−µ′(1−q)] is negative and decreasing
in q. Therefore, for p > 1+ ηµ
′(1−p)−1
η[µ′(p)λ(p)−µ′(1−p)] , the optimal q
∗ = 1, otherwise,
optimal q∗ = 0.
To be more specific, let µ′(x) = β, then
p =
ηβλ(q)− 1
ηβ[λ(q)− 1] = 1 +
ηβ − 1
ηβ[λ(q)− 1] .
For 0 < p < 1, we must have ηβ < 1.
If λ′(q) ≤ 0, then ηβλ(q)−1ηβ[λ(q)−1] is decreasing in q. Optimal q∗ = 1 if p >
ηβλ(p)−1
ηβ[λ(p)−1] and q
∗ = 0 otherwise.
(ii) General: S-state Case
From FOC, we have
η{
∑
Gain
psµ
′(us −
∑
S
qsus) +
∑
Loss
psµ
′(
∑
S
qsus − us)λ(
∑
S
qsus − us)} = 1.
Specifically, for µ′(·) ≡ β, ∑
Loss
ps[λ(
∑
S
qsus − us)− 1] = 1−ηβηβ .
Since the LHS > 0, we have ηβ < 1.
For λ′(·) ≤ 0, if ∑
Loss
ps[λ(
∑
S
qsus − us) − 1] < 1−ηβηβ , then the total utility
is increasing in
∑
S
qsus. An increase in
∑
S
qsus will decrease the value of∑
Loss
ps[λ(
∑
S
qsus−us)− 1](if the range of loss remains the same), making it
further below 1−ηβηβ . Therefore, optimal sets of {q∗s} are those satisfy∑
Loss
ps[λ(
∑
S
q∗sus − us)− 1] =
1− ηβ
ηβ
,
where Loss = {s ∈ S : us −
∑
s∈S
q∗sus < 0}.
*
REFERENCES
Akerlof, George A., and William T. Dickens. 1982. “The Economic Conse-
quences of Cognitive Dissonance.” American Economic Review, 72(3): 307–19.
36 WORKING PAPER JULY 2013
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2008. “Stocks as Lotteries: The Im-
plications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices.” American Economic
Review, 98(5): 2066–2100.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2002. “Self-Confidence and Personal
Motivation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3): 871–915.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2004. “Willpower and Personal Rules.”
Journal of Political Economy, 112(4): 848–886.
Bernheim, Douglas B., and Raphael Thomadsen. 2005. “Memory and
Anticipation.” Economic Journal, 115(503): 271–304.
Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Jonathan A. Parker. 2005. “Optimal Ex-
pectations.” American Economic Review, 95(4): 1092–1118.
Brunnermeier, Markus K., Christian Gollier, and Jonathan A. Parker.
2007. “Optimal Beliefs, Asset Prices, and the Preference for Skewed Returns.”
American Economic Review, 97(2): 159–165.
Camerer, Colin, and Martin Weber. 1992. “Recent developments in model-
ing preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
5: 325–370.
Caplin, Andrew, and John Leahy. 2001. “Psychological Expected Util-
ity Theory and Anticipatory Feelings.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
116(1): 55–79.
Caplin, Andrew, and John Leahy. 2004. “The supply of information by a
concerned expert.” Economic Journal, 114(497): 487–505.
Chaiken, S., and Y. Trope, ed. 1999. Dual-process theories in social psychol-
ogy. New York: Guilford Press.
De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Summers, Lawrence H., and
Robert J. Waldmann. 1990. “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 98(4): 703–38.
Eliaz, Kfir, and Ran Spiegler. 2006. “Can anticipatory feelings explain
anomalous choices of information sources?” Games and Economic Behavior,
56(1): 87–104.
Epstein, Larry, and Igor Kopylov. 2006. “Cognitive Dissonance and Choice.”
University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) RCER Work-
ing Papers 525.
Fischhoff, B., P. Slovic, and S. Lichtenstein. 1977. “Knowing with cer-
tainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence.” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3: 552564.
37 WORKING PAPER JULY 2013
Friedman, James W., and Claudio Mezzetti. 2005. “Random belief equilib-
rium in normal form games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2): 296–323.
Goel, V., and R. Dolan. 2003. “Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief.”
Cognition, 87(1): B11–B22.
Hoffrage, U. 2004. Overconfidence. Westport, CT:Psychology Press.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. . first ed., London, Eng-
land:Penguin Group.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Anal-
ysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica, 47(2): 263–91.
Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “A Model of Reference-
Dependent Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4): 1133 – 1165.
Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2009. “Reference-Dependent Con-
sumption Plans.” American Economic Review, 99(3): 909–936.
Kruger, J. 1999. “Lake Wobegon be gone! The ”below-average effect” and the
egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 77: 221232.
Kruger, J., and J. Burrus. 2004. “Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic op-
timism (and pessimism).” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40,: 332–
340.
Loewenstein, George. 1987. “Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Con-
sumption.” Economic Journal, 97(387): 666–84.
Macera, R. 2011. “Dynamic Beliefs.” Submitted.
Mayraz, Guy. 2011a. “Priors and Desires.” Centre for Economic Performance,
LSE CEP Discussion Papers dp1047.
Mayraz, Guy. 2011b. “Wishful Thinking.” Centre for Economic Performance,
LSE CEP Discussion Papers.
Moore, Don A., and Paul J. Healy. 2008. “The trouble with overconfidence.”
Psychological review, 115(2): 502–17.
Muth, John F. 1961. “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Move-
ments.” Econometrica, 29(3): pp. 315–335.
Rabin, Matthew. 1994. “Cognitive dissonance and social change.” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 23(2): 177–194.
38 WORKING PAPER JULY 2013
Shepperd, James A., Judith A. Ouellette, and Julie K. Fernandez. 1996.
“Abandoning unrealistic optimism: Performance estimates and the temporal
proximity of self-relevant feedback.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 70(4): 844–855.
Spiegler, Ran. 2008. On Two Points of View Regarding Revealed Preference and
Behavioral Economics. Oxford University Press.
Stewart, Clark B. 1998. Political-economy A comparative approach. . second
ed., Westport, CT:Praeger Publishers.
Svenson, O. 1981. “Are we less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers?”
Acta Psychologica, 47,: 143–151.
Sweeny, K., P. J. Carroll, and J. A. Shepperd. 2006. “Is Optimism Always
Best?: Future Outlooks and Preparedness.” Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 15(6): 302–306.
Taylor, Kevin M., and James A. Shepperd. 1998. “Bracing for the Worst:
Severity, Testing, and Feedback Timing as Moderators of the Optimistic Bias.”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24: 915–926.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect The-
ory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, 5(4): 297–323.
Windschitl, P. D., J. Kruger, and E. Simms. 2003. “The influence of egocen-
trism and focalism on peoples optimism in competitions: When what affects
us equally affects me more.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
85: 389408.
